EDITORIAL
PPE Development and Needs in HMA
by Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ]

Left to right, the image shows flechettes from a munition, pre-chopped fragments from a bounding fragmentation mine, and prescored diamond fragmentation from a submunition.
Image courtesy of the author.

A

s written in the International Mine Action

hardened, polycarbonate can flex in a way that has often pre-

Standards (IMAS) 10.30 on personal protective

vented the blast front and associated tiny pieces of mine casing

equipment (PPE), “the primary means of prevent-

and unburned explosive from blinding the wearers.

ing explosive injury in the workplace is by the supervised use

It is fragmentation that causes most fatal injuries during de-

of demining tools and processes that reduce the likelihood of

mining. Fragmentation may come from the munition, from

an unintended detonation.” The IMAS goes on to state that

the soil and stones surrounding it, or tiny pieces of the explo-

PPE “should be the final protective measure after all planning,

sive charge itself. Unsurprisingly, the most damaging kind of

training and procedural efforts to reduce risk have been tak-

fragmentation is deliberately built into the munition either by

en.” To date the “final protective measure” has been to provide

designing a casing that fragments or by surrounding the ex-

PPE that is practical but that does not provide full protection.

plosive charge with fragments of metal, some of which may be

The threat posed by the blast wave(s) associated with the

shaped to be self-orientating and especially penetrating.

detonation of high or low explosive is highly dependent on

There are several reasons why the fragmentation threat to

the quantity of explosive involved. With small blast mines,

deminers has not been addressed despite the fact that even

the speed of the blast front (as the volume of gas expands) rap-

small fragmentation devices have regularly killed deminers

idly declines and many deminers wearing no protection on

wearing PPE.

their bodies have suffered no body injury despite being very

1. To provide reliable protection against fragments by in-

close during accidents. The evidence from the Database of

creasing the layers of flexible armor or by adding hard

Demining Accidents (DDAS) is that body armor serves little

armor panels would increase weight dramatically. This

proven purpose when the accident involves a small blast mine

would make the wearer uncomfortable and restrict mo-

unless the deminer’s hand-tool breaks up and becomes part of

bility in a way that could increase the risk of an accident

the hazard. In any close-quarter blast involving kilograms of

occurring. Experience indicates that it would also in-

explosive, the disruptive blast forces can pass through body

crease the risk of the PPE not being worn at all.

armor and pulverize the cells of the wearer almost as effec-

2. Effective fragmentation armor would have to be ex-

tively as if the armor were not there. Polycarbonate blast vi-

tended to protect the arms and legs because the spray

sors are also of no proven use in a large blast but are useful

of fragments is not confined to the torso. The improved

against small blasts. As long as the material is not deliberately

armor would also have to cover the face and head, but
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The images show combat body armor with a V50 of 450 m/s and a helmet after being struck by fragments from a PROM-1 bounding
fragmentation mine. The deminer suffered multiple penetrations to torso, arms, and head and bled out rapidly.
Images courtesy of the author.

effective transparent visor material that could match

also has a shaped charge designed to penetrate armored steel,

the protection of body armor is not available, so this is

which nothing short of well-spaced layers of armored steel or

not possible.

reactive armor panels can stop close-up.

3. The much increased costs would mean that demining

Whatever PPE is issued, the informed deminer knows

organizations could not afford to do as much actual de-

that it cannot provide real protection against a worst case

mining—and controlling the risks faced by deminers

scenario, but that does not mean that we should not be try-

has to be balanced against the risks being faced by the

ing to improve PPE so that it can provide effective protec-

population who are waiting for them to arrive.

tion more often.

Reasons one and two are based on the premise that any pro-

The third reason for not improving PPE—increased cost—

tection is only as good as its weakest point. To provide torso

is unsound because failure to do “all that is reasonable” to

protection able to stop the fragments while leaving the wear-

protect the workers could end up costing the employer far

er’s arms or face unprotected is inconsistent and illogical. This

more than the cost of better PPE. In the author’s experience,

is true, but it is not a good reason not to increase protection

most donors of HMA are open to requests for support to pro-

where we can because the PPE we provide is already incon-

vide better PPE for those doing the work they fund.

sistent. The current IMAS requirement for body armor is a
NATO STANAG V50 of 450 m/s while the face and eye pro-

Why Have There Been No Significant Improvements?

tection is 5 mm polycarbonate, which has a NATO STANAG

There have been improvements to demining PPE over the past

V50 of less than half of that.1,2 The V50 is the speed at which

twenty years, but most have been incremental. One example is

half of the fragments (50 percent) compromise the protection.
So how can we justify requiring torso protection that is far
greater than for the face? The answer is that it is not logical,
but it was the best we could do when this part of the IMAS
was written.
There is always a balance to be drawn between what is practical and what is ideal. In humanitarian mine action (HMA),
we have rarely pursued the ideal because whatever we do must
be practical. This is seen as being realistic because many of the
hazards we confront simply cannot be protected against with
any PPE currently available.
For example, this KB1 submunition contains only 30 g of
high explosive that produces an expanding blast front that is
relatively easy to protect against at 30 cm. It also has a fragmentation body with steel ball bearings encased in a nylon body that most body armor used in HMA could stop at
a distance of a meter, even if the visor could not. However, it
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KB1 submission.
Image courtesy of the author.

The images show the lighter blast visor and the ROFI face mask.5,6
Images courtesy of the author.

the availability of lighter body armor materials with a tight-

The industry needs a PPE testing regime that provides a rele-

er weave that allows higher levels of protection to be achieved

vant means of comparing one PPE product with another. The

in a garment of the same weight, or more of the wearer to be

only test we currently have is the NATO STANAG 2920 test,

covered without a weight increase. The design of a lighter vi-

which was designed to provide a comparable measure of the

sor and some improved hand tools have also been incremental

protection offered against bullets and fragments in a combat

improvements.3 The ROFI demining face mask is the only truly

scenario. To this end, the STANAG testing regime involves fir-

novel advance because it makes use of a very lightweight lami-

ing single, carefully shaped and weighed fragments of a very

nate named PURE, but its design has been criticized and it is not

hard metal directly down a barrel toward the material at pre-

widely used.4

cisely measured speeds. The test is repeated at least six times

Changes to demining PPE over the last twenty years have
been largely minor for three reasons.

with each strike well separated from the others. The result is
calculated as a V50 in meters or feet per second.

1. Lack of demand. There is a general absence of an ex-

Almost every part of the STANAG test is inappropriate to

pressed wish for better PPE from the end users or their

use when appraising demining PPE. When an explosive haz-

managers.

ard detonates in front of a deminer, the PPE is struck by a blast

2. The current risk is thought tolerable. A generally low

front, which the test does nothing to replicate. It is also struck

level of accidents has led many involved in demining to

by fragments of the ground and parts of the munition’s cas-

consider the current level of risk to be tolerable.

ing and/or deliberate fragments inside it. It may be struck by

3. There are more immediate ways to manage risk.

multiple fragments that are bunched closely together or fol-

Managing risk by making improvements to procedures

lowing one after another. The fragments are not of a strict-

is known to be effective at preventing injury, so efforts

ly controlled hardness, shape, and weight and have not been

in that direction are more likely to yield immediate

fired from a barrel. Even the pre-shaped fragments in frag-

benefits.

mentation munitions tumble in the air, which usually makes
them much easier to stop than a directed projectile moving at

Lack of Demand

the same velocity. However, the explosions that launch these

Although deminers rarely ask for better PPE, that may be be-

fragments can generate a brief heat of over 4,000 degrees

cause they often believe that the PPE they have provides great-

Celsius (e.g., TNT) and some heat is transferred to the frag-

er protection than it does or that nothing better is available.

ments, which can become hot enough to damage the material
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and this is a level of risk that is unavoidable and
“accepted in a given context.”10 When conflict is over,
people often become accustomed to living with a
higher level of risk than would be tolerated elsewhere.
It is inappropriate for any humanitarian demining
organization to adopt the high-risk mindset that may
prevail in an insecure post-conflict context because
it is the current humanitarian values in peaceful and
secure societies that should apply. These are the values
that those paying for humanitarian mine action want
to promote as part of supporting a sustainable peace.
There are large holes penetrating this body armor material, which has
burned and shrunk away from hot fragments from a bounding mine.
The material had a NATO STANAG 2920 V50 in excess of 450 m/s.
Image courtesy of DDAS.

Throughout the history of HMA, the high level of
risk that is tolerated where we work has been used to
justify using lower levels of PPE than is acceptable during such activities as range clearance and explosive

they strike by melting or burning it. It is true that much of

ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in Europe and America. Early

the kinetic energy in any projectile is converted to heat when

demining PPE was inadequate and ranged from industrial

it is obliged to stop rapidly, but some fragments generated by

safety spectacles to combat armor and purpose-designed al-

mines and explosive ordnance start off hot, a fact that makes

beit minimal protection.
The requirements of the IMAS published in 2001 went

some PPE materials shrink away from them.
In 2007, a European Workshop Agreement resulted in

some way to level that playing field but did not bring stan-

the publication of a test protocol for demining PPE that was

dards up to those used in civil EOD work in Europe and the

referenced in IMAS 10.30 in 2008 but was quickly found

United States, because those drafting the IMAS, including

An

the author, deemed that impractical. However, if we could re-

attempt to create a better European agreement was started

duce the number of deminer injuries and/or the severity of

to be unfit for purpose and quietly removed in 2010.

7,8

by the Royal Military Academy (RMA) in Belgium as part

their injuries, it is an obligation for any humanitarian or-

of the TIRAMISU project in 2016 but was not completed.9

ganization to do so because we must do “everything reason-

One feature of the planned test was the use of a triple-barrel

able” to manage and reduce risk of injury to our employees.

fragment launcher so that the effect of near simultaneous

So the current risk is only tolerable if we can show that we

fragment strikes could be measured. There would still be

have done everything reasonable to manage and mitigate risk

no way of recording the heat of the fragment during flight,

and show that we have done this in a way that would sat-

but this would be an advance because some armor materials

isfy a court of law. Some international demining insurance

cannot withstand multiple simultaneous impacts as
well as others.
The Current Risk is Thought Tolerable
The definition of tolerable risk in the IMAS is “risk
which is accepted in a given context based on current values of society.”10 This is taken directly from
the definition used by the International Standards
Organization (ISO) and was designed to apply across
all industries, not specifically those dealing with explosive hazards in countries that lack the means to clear
the hazards themselves. Every industry is intended to
interpret that definition appropriately in their own
working context.
The level of risk that people live with during conflict
is usually higher than it would be during peacetime,
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The image shows the RMA’s triple fragment launcher for testing PPE
with near-simultaneous strikes.
Image courtesy of Georgios Kechagiadakis and Marc Pirlot.

Left to right, the images show demining PPE used in Mozambique and Cambodia in 1997.11
Images courtesy of the author.

providers insist that the minimum level of PPE required in

information becomes known. The Lebanon Mine Action

the IMAS is used, which implies that the IMAS level of PPE

Centre determines the level of risk that is tolerable at

is broadly accepted as being reasonable, but PPE is only the

any task. In the event of disagreement, the final arbiters

final protective measure after all other reasonable means of

of what is ‘all reasonable effort’ shall be the Government

managing risk have been taken.
The definition of tolerable risk in the current edition of the
National Mine Action Standards in Lebanon includes examples that may be useful to others:13
“…The ‘tolerable risk‘ remaining after an area has been
searched, cleared and released is the risk of explosive
hazards being beneath the required search depth in
that task area. The ‘tolerable risk’ to demining staff
is the risk remaining after all reasonable efforts have
been made to train, equip and supervise staff in the
conduct of inherently safe demining procedures. All
reasonable effort includes the production of a formal

and Courts of Justice in Lebanon.”14

There Are More Immediate Ways to Manage Risk
Dramatic progress has been made in risk avoidance over
the past twenty years. One breakthrough came because of advances in metal detector technology, which meant that many
hazards with a minimum-metal content could be reliably located. Another was the use of small radio-controlled machines
to process areas with fragmentation mines before the deminers deployed.15 Then came the use of long-handled rakes for excavation that used distance to avoid injury when there was an
anti-personnel blast mine detonation. Today, there is the in-

task risk assessment designed to ensure that appropriate

creasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with high-

measures to mitigate risk are taken. All formal risk

resolution cameras that are able to hover and allow the remote

assessments must be updated as work progresses and new

inspection of potential hazards before anyone approaches.

The images show the PPE currently being used by a demining organization clearing improvised explosive devices (IED) in Syria. In
the author’s opinion, they are doing everything reasonable to protect their workers both with PPE and with specialist IED training.
Images courtesy of MAT Kosovo.12
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Images from a small unmanned aircraft (SUA) show the extent of structural damage, then close-up views of visible suspicious
items.
Images courtesy of field operatives in Syria.

In the example above in Raqqah, Syria, in February 2018,

frequent. As a result, catastrophic damage to hands and eyes

a preliminary camera overview helped to identify access

are now by far the most common severe injuries. Meanwhile,

routes and make informed decisions about approaches that

fragmentation injuries still cause the most deaths.

minimized risk to the workers. The skilled pilot then used

Although there have been no significant advances in dem-

the camera to look through doorways and windows and

ining PPE over the past twenty years, there has been a reduc-

could identify a passive infrared (PIR) triggered IED (in the

tion in the IMAS PPE requirement.16 The original 2001 IMAS

cardboard box with the sensor protruding) before anyone

10.30 PPE requirements included the provision of frontal

approached. The small unmanned aircraft (SUA) gave the or-

throat protection and the wearing of a full-face visor. In 2008,

ganization an up-to-date overview of the extent of structur-

these former requirements were downgraded to recommen-

al damage (a common cause of non-explosive injury), then a

dations.17 The author asked for one of these changes because

close-up view of visible suspicious items. They used this in-

the accident record showed that visors were not being worn

formation to make an informed search plan that minimized

(or worn correctly) when accidents occurred whereas goggles

risk to their staff.

were already being used to good effect.18 The requirement was

Those conducting any kind of risk management must first

reduced to allow the wearing of goggles but recommended the

have had appropriate training and/or experience so that they

continued use of visors. The downgrading of the requirement

can identify and mitigate risks. Thereafter, managing risk ef-

for throat protection appears to have gone unnoticed because

fectively in HMA relies on having as much information about

almost all demining body armor still has a collar that folds

each unique task as possible so that an evidence-based risk

back in a blast and protects the wearer’s throat. Nonetheless,

assessment can be made. The use of SUA in Syria provides

after the passage of ten years, it is perhaps time that the PPE

a good example of extending the knowledge available, im-

requirements in IMAS 10.30 were revisited.

proving identification and better mitigating risks in that context. Of course the process does not eliminate risk, but it does
show an organization making “all reasonable effort” to identify risks as they plan to avoid casualties.

There are at least four other needs related to PPE that should
be addressed:
1. To reduce the severity of blast injuries, further improvements in the design of blast resistant hand-tools would
be beneficial, as would their adoption by organizations

Needs
The accident record in the DDAS shows that PPE has been

use but do not require it).

worth wearing because it has often reduced the number or

2. To reduce eye loss, the invention of a lighter and stron-

the severity of the wearer’s injuries. Although we have nev-

ger blast visor material could encourage the correct use

er had PPE that could reliably protect against all common

of visors. This is rumored to have already happened;

fragmentation hazards in HMA, we still do not have a way to

however, the material’s manufacture and use have yet

assess the relative effectiveness of existing or new PPE prod-

to filter down to readily available and affordable dem-

ucts, which might do better.

10

who have not yet done so (the IMAS recommend their

ining PPE.

The hierarchy of common disabling injuries resulting

3. To increase body protection, the development of flex-

from demining accidents over the past twenty years has only

ible ceramic armor (e.g., modified Dragon Skin armor)

changed because stepping on a mine has become much less

or the use of PURE (i.e., the light material used in the
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Smith (front) wearing the most commonly used demining PPE in Tajikistan in 2016 – the deminers behind are wearing the ROFI mask.
Images courtesy of Major Firuz Asadbekov, Humanitarian Demining unit, Army of Tajikistan.

ROFI demining face mask) would be worthwhile. This
armor need not be able to protect against rifle fire (often approaching 1,000 m/s), but any increase to com-

The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of Conventional Weapons
Destruction are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison
University, or the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.

fort and affordability in deminer protection would be
an improvement.
4. To allow end users to compare products, the ability to
compare one PPE product’s performance against another in a low-cost test that replicated an agreed, typical
demining accident event would encourage manufacturers to make further incremental improvements.
Finally, while the PPE provision has remained fairly static,
the refinement and development of procedures and equipment that keep people at a distance from the hazards has reduced risk to the deminers in many organizations over the
past 20 years. Alongside the formal conduct of disciplined risk
assessments, the author believes that the avoidance approach
of responsible field operatives often demonstrates doing “all
that is reasonable” to make risk tolerable in spite of the inadequacy of the available PPE.19
See endnotes page 61

Andy Smith
University of Genoa
www.nolandmines.com; www.ddasonline.com
A.V.Smith (AVS, Andy Smith) served as a
PPE specialist on the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board for
11 years and was the founder and keeper of the DDAS.20 He has worked in humanitarian mine action (HMA) over more
than 20 years at all levels from surveyor/
deminer to Chief Technical Advisor to
UNDP country programs. Having drafted the original IMAS Technical
Note for Mine Action on Field Risk Assessment (TNMA), he was
contracted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) to produce current field risk assessment training
materials in 2016.21
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ENDNOTES
PPE Development and Needs in HMA by Smith [ from page 5]
1.

NATO Standardization Agency (STANAG) 2920 PPS (edition 2) Ballistic test method for Personal Armor Materials and Combat Clothing, NSA/0723-PPS/2920, 2003.

2.

The author has tested 5mm untreated polycarbonate using NATO STANAG 2920 and found a V50 ranging from 250 m/s to 280 m/s. The uncertain result is probably
caused by variations in the ambient temperature or in the temperature of the fragments (which were fired using blanks or by compressed air).

3.

Hand-tools are included in IMAS 10.30 PPE because the accident record shows that the use of well designed tools can protect the deminer by distance and by avoiding
parts of the tool separating and causing injury.

4.

PURE is a polypropylene self-reinforced composite material: see http://www.ditweaving.com/

5.

This visor was designed by the author and given freely to the manufacturer: See: Security Devices. “SD Platinum Visor.” Accessed 12 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2vghH7B.

6.

The author was invited to advise during a workshop in Norway at the start of the design process for this mask, but does not like the result. For information about the
mask, see: Rofi: Protecting People. Accessed 12 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2vghUrp.

7.

European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Workshop Agreement 15756, now defunct.

8.

IMAS 10.30, 2nd Edition, amendment 2, “References to CWA for T&E of PPE were removed from Clause1 and Annex A” at the start of 2011.

9.

The author was an advisor to the project.

10. From IMAS 04.10, Glossary, 2014. This definition is drawn from the International Standards Organization (ISO) Guide 51:1999(E).
11. Left to right, the pictures show a UNADP deminer in Mozambique a HALO Trust and a MAG deminer in Cambodia.
12. Pictures taken in 2017 during specialist IED clearance training conducted in Syria by PCM ERW Risk Management & MAT Kosovo. www.pcm-erw.com, email: info@
pcm-erw.com.
13. Lebanon NMAS 04.10 Glossary, February, 2018.
14. Drafted by the LMAC with the author’s input, 2018.
15. The most successful of which in terms of sales is the DOK-ING MV4 made in Croatia (which has also supplied U.S. forces in Afghanistan).
16. IMAS 10.30 PPE, Edition 1, 2001. “The frontal protection ensemble provided to employees, whether required to kneel, sit or squat shall be designed to cover the eyes,
throat (frontal neck), chest, abdomen and genitals”.
17. IMAS 10.30 2nd Edition, 2008.
18. As a member of the IMAS Review Board, the author argued for this change because of the lack of injuries sustained while wearing goggles while excavating with rakes.
The wearing of blast goggles during EOD and IED tasks has since become common, which was not anticipated but the author respects the principle of wearer’s choice
as long as blast visors are available at the task if they choose to wear them.
19. For a formal HMA Field Risk Assessment training course, the author recommends the one that he provided some materials for at GICHD. Contact: r.evans@gichd.org
20. Database of Demining Accidents, which is an informative reference in IMAS 10.30, (Annex A) and online at www.ddasonline.com.
21. International Mine Action Standards Technical Note for Mine Action (IMAS TNMA) TN 10.20 20 2009.
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